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The Republic of Tunisia is an Arab Muslim nation whose primary
orientation since achieving independence nearly thirty years ago has been
towards Westernization and modernization. Its political stability and
economic progress have been remarkable. The coming decade, however,
promises to be a period of turmoil for Tunisia, as a number of social and
political forces are creating an atmosphere of disunity and dissension which
can be expected to undermine the national equilibrium.
For the United States, the development of events in Tunisia is a matter of
concern. The loss of Tunisia as a voice of moderation in Arab affairs would
cause America to lose one of its strongest allies in the region and suffer a
loss of prestige and influence in the North Africa/Middle East area. Further,
the concept of Westernization as a means to promote human development
would be weakened.
This study analyzes the current situation in Tunisia and its implications
for the United States in the context of its economic, political and strategic
dimensions. American policy goals and options are examined and
recommendations for future U. S. policy toward Tunisia are made.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION 7
II. THE HISTORICAL SETTING 1
1
A. EARLY HISTORY 1
B. THE ARABS ARRIVE 1
2
C. THE OTTOMAN PERIOD 1
3
D. THE FRENCH PROTECTORATE 1
5
E. BOURGUIBAS DRIVE FOR INDEPENDENCE 1
6
III. THE ECONOMIC DIMENSION 2
1
A. GEOGRAPHY AND CLIMATE 2
1
B. THE PEOPLE 23
C. ECONOMIC HISTORY 24
D. THE CURRENT STATE OF THE ECONOMY 30
E. ECONOMIC PROSPECTS 3
F. DEVELOPMENT AND PLANNING 34
IV. THE POLITICAL DIMENSION 35
A. AN OVERVIEW 35
B. TUNISIA'S MODERN HISTORY 36
C. GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS 42
D. THE PASSING OF POWER 43
E. POLITICAL OPPOSITION 44
F. RESURGENT ISLAM 47
V. THE STRATEGIC DIMENSION 5
1
A. AN OVERVIEW 51
B. TUNISIA'S GEOPOLITICAL IMPORTANCE 52
C TUNISIAN MILITARY STRENGTH ——
—
53
D. THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY — 55
E. THE U.S.-TUNISIAN MILITARY CONNECTION 56
VI. TUNISIA'S FOREIGN POLICY 58
A. TUNISIA'S NEIGHBORS 58
B. THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT 60
C THE ARAB LEAGUE 62
D. WESTERN EUROPE 63
E. THE UNITED STATES 64
F. COMMUNIST COUNTRIES 65
VII. U.S. POLICY GOALS AND OPTIONS 68
A. THE ECONOMIC DIMENSION 68
B. THE POLITICAL DIMENSION 70
C THE STRATEGIC DIMENSION — 73
VIII. CONCLUSION 76
APPENDIX A: COUNTRY DATA 8
1
APPENDIX B: MAP OF TUNISIA 84
APPENDIX C: GOVERNMENT STRUCTURE 85
APPENDIX D: MILITARY STRENGTH 86
LIST OF REFERENCES 88
BIBLIOGRAPHY 9
1
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 93
I. INTRODUCTION
Tunisia occupies a unique position in American foreign policy. Relations
between the two countries have been warm since Tunisia achieved
independence in 1956, and America now counts Tunisia among its very best
friends in the Arab world. From the American perspective, Tunisia has
significant political and strategic importance, and the economic ties between
the two countries strongly influence the character of the relationship.
Tunisia is located in North Africa, jutting up into the Mediterranean Sea
at a point about midway between Gibraltar and the Suez Canal. The 90-mile
straight between Tunisia and Sicily is the Mediterranean's narrowest major
channel. The natural harbor at Bizerte is deep enough to permit undetected
use by submarines. Control of Tunisian facilities and waters, or denial of
them to a potential enemy, is of tremendous strategic importance to the
United States and its European allies.
Sandwiched between Algeria and Libya, two Arab states with radical and
revolutionary traditions, Tunisia has lived for years in an atmosphere of
insecurity. Both countries have economic and military resources far beyond
those of Tunisia, causing Tunisia to depend upon diplomacy and support
from the international community for its security. Although the United
States has not signed any defense treaties with Tunisia, America has
supplied Tunisia with considerable military aid and training in recent years.
The United States is consistently among Tunisia's leading trading
partners, providing about seven percent of Tunisia's imports and receiving
about twenty-three percent of its exports in 1983 [Ref. l:p. 587]. American
foreign aid to Tunisia is also increasing, with a total of over $97 million
requested in the 1986 budget [Ref. 2:p. 6761.
Politically, Tunisia has been a moderate voice in the Arab world.
President-for-Life Habib Bourguibas approach toward regional politics has
been a pragmatic one that has often caused him to be at odds with other
Arab leaders. He has attempted to reconcile traditional Islamic values with
the need for modernization, replacing Islamic institutions with secular ones
while maintaining Islam as both a state religion and social culture.
Bourguibas support of U.S. policy in the Middle East has been only recently
tempered by criticism of the closeness of the American-Israeli relationship.
He remains one of our closest friends in the region.
The importance of Tunisia in Middle Eastern politics has been historically
underrated. Its small size, relatively poor economy and political stability
have kept it off the front page of the world's newspapers and out of the
minds of U.S. policy planners. In spite of the surge of interest in Middle
Eastern and North African politics and economics since the turmoil of the
mid-1970s, writings about Tunisia during the past decade are limited to a
few books of Tunisian history, some travel guides, and several articles in
academic journals. Tunisia's importance in the region has been
overshadowed by its larger, richer, more powerful and more controversial
neighbors.
Perhaps Tunisia has been largely ignored because some important events
went unnoticed by those who should have paid more attention. The
historical stability of Tunisia's domestic politics is being undermined by a
combination of factors, including Bourguibas failing health, the rise of
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Islamic fundamentalism and threats by neighboring Libya and Algeria. As
Bourguiba s ability to prevent challenges to his one-party rule deteriorates,
opposition parties are forming coalitions in preparation for their bids for
power when he finally dies. The character of Tunisia's leadership in the
post-Bourguiba era will have significant impact on the politics of the region.
Tunisia gained new prominence in the region when the Arab League
moved its headquarters to Tunis from Cairo following the signing of the
Egypt-Israel peace treaty, and when the Palestine Liberation Organization
set up its headquarters in Tunis after being ousted from Lebanon in the
wake of Israels 1982 invasion and occupation of that country. Also
contributing to Tunisia's new-found political importance was the election of
Tunisian Habib Chatti as secretary-general of the Organization of the Islamic
Conference for 1 984- 1 985 (Ref . 3:p. 2041.
The United States needs to concern itself with Tunisia moreso than in
past years for a number of reasons. Washington now has a military
involvement in Tunisia that would be in jeopardy if Tunisia were to adopt a
strict anti-Western attitude. Besides aircraft and other equipment, the U.S.
would stand to lose access to Tunisian air and naval facilities. 1 Tunisia now
welcomes U.S. Sixth Fleet vessels, including nuclear warships, in its ports.
Repair and replenishment of Soviet vessels were stopped in response to a
request by Washington, but port calls in Tunisia by Soviet ships continue
[Ref. 4:p. 1261. With increasing Soviet naval movement in and out of
According to Wright [Ref. 4:pp. 126-27], details of U.S. access to
Tunisian military facilities are kept quiet, but Washington has acquired or
may envision acquiring such access in exchange for arms the United States
would otherwise be reluctant to provide.
Algerian and Libyan ports, the shifting military balance in the southern
Mediterranean, and the uncertainty or the U.S. position in Egypt and in
Greece, the importance of American access to facilities in Tunisia is obvious.
The delicacy of the political situation in and around Tunisia calls for a
carefully formulated U.S. policy toward that country. Either too little or too
much involvement could be dangerous to American interests. We must be
prepared to protect Tunisia against real aggression without causing Tunisia
to appear to be dependent upon us for its economic and political survival.
This thesis focuses on the nature and significance of the United States-
Tunisia relationship by analyzing in detail its economic, political and
strategic aspects. The policy goals and options of each of these three
dimensions are discussed, and recommendations for future U.S. policy
toward Tunisia are offered.
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II. THE HISTORICAL SETTING
A. EARLY HISTORY
Tunisia is one of mans oldest homes. Flint tools and weapons dating
back to 10,000 B.C. have been found in the coastal regions, and cave art in
the Atlas mountains provides a fairly exhaustive account of life in the period
from about 6,000 to 2,000 B.C. Southern Tunisia was inhabited by nomadic
hunters and herders until the encroaching Sahara Desert forced them north
in the second millenium B.C
The land that is now Tunisia first became known to the rest of the world
in 1 101 B.C, when Phoenician sailors established Utica at the mouth of the
Majerda River. It was near Utica that the great Phoenician capital city of
Carthage was founded some 300 years later. By 550 B.C. , Carthage had
reached a position of commercial and naval supremacy in the Mediterranean.
Carthage was at its peak during the fourth century B.C., drawing it into
confrontation with the emerging power of Rome. The rivalry developed into
the Punic Wars (264-241 B.C., 218-201 B.C. and 149-146 B.C.), which ended
in the destruction of the Carthaginian Empire.
Carthage was incorporated within the Roman Empire and rebuilt by the
Emperor Augustus. Intensive colonization brought new prosperity. During
the first two centuries A.D., Carthage was the empires second city.
As the power of Rome declined in the fourth century A.D., Carthage was
lost to the Vandals, but was recovered by the Byzantines in the sixth
century. The Byzantines never really took control of their new land,
however, as they were occupied by feuds with their government in
Constantinople, military rebellions and religious heretics. The relatively
11
short Byzantine period was ended by the invasion of the Arabs shortly after
the death of the Prophet Mohammed in 632 AD
B. THE ARABS ARRIVE
The Arabs established the city of Kairouan, about 100 miles south of
Carthage, as a military and religious base from which to complete their
conquest of North Africa. Carthage fell to the Muslims in 693 and the Arabs
began to exercise temporal and religious authority over their new subjects.
Islam spread rapidly among the native Berbers, but they quickly adopted
Kharijite (seceders; literally, those who emerge from impropriety) heresies.
Most of the eighth century was occupied by Berber uprisings. Islamic
factional disputes, and internal Arab revolts. In the turmoil of the period,
the Abbasid dynasty overthrew the ruling Umayyads and relocated the
caliphate in Baghdad. After a period of total anarchy in the late eighth
century, Ibrahim ibn Aghlab was appointed ruler of Ifriqiya—the area that
corresponds roughly to present-day Tunisia.
The Aghlabid state existed through the ninth century. This was a
prosperous period for the region, referred to by some as the "golden age."
Traditions of cultural and intellectual excellence were established by the
Aghlabids before their dynasty was overthrown by the Fatimids in the early
tenth century.
The Fatimids were fanatical and militant Shi'as who imposed a harsh and
intolerant rule. They were mostly non-Arab Muslims who resented and
opposed the aristocratic manner of the desert Arabs who had become
lfriqiya's elite. The Fatimids provided the opportunity for the Berbers to
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take their revenge on the Arabs who had ruled them for over two hundred
years.
The Fatamids conquered Egypt and moved their capital to Cairo in 973.
Ifriqiya was left in the hands of their Berber vassals, the Zirids. The
economy deteriorated as trade routes shifted and, out of desperation, the
Zirids denounced Shi'ism in 1049 in order to gain the economic support of
the Sunni Arabs. In retaliation, the Fatimids ravaged Ifriqiya, destroying the
economic and political systems.
In 1087, the Normans of southern Italy took over Ifriqiya for
commercial purposes, but they let the Zirids continue their rule. Early in the
twelfth century, the Zirids transferred their allegiance back to the Fatimids
in Cairo. By 1 160, the Almohad Muslims from Morocco had swept across
Tunisia and established it as part of the empire of Marrakesh.
The authority of Baghdad was restored in the early thirteenth century
with the establishment of the Hafsid government in Tunisia. The Hafsid
period brought the capital of Tunisia to Tunis and made possible a second
flourishing of Arab culture and scholarship. Despite several incidents of
internal political intrigue and tribal unrest, the Hafsid era lasted nearly three
hundred years. By the end of the fifteenth century, Tunisia had become
involved in the struggle between the Spanish and Ottoman forces for control
of the Mediterranean.
C. THE OTTOMAN PERIOD
In the early sixteenth century, Khair ad-Din, the legendary pirate who
had become commander in chief of the Ottoman fleet, mounted a successful
seaborne assault on Tunis. The following year, Tunis was taken by Spanish
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troops, but it was lost to the Turks again a few years later. In 1 573, Don
Juan of Austria took Tunis for just a year before losing it to a large force of
Turkish sailors and soldiers. In 1 574, the Hafsid Dynasty ended and Tunisia
became a province of the Ottoman Empire, governed by the Turks in Algiers,
with Turkish as the language of administration.
Direct Ottoman rule of Tunisia was brief, a military revolt in 1591
reducing the power and prestige of the appointed governor. By 1606,
Tunisia's de facto independence was recognized, although it remained a
part of the Ottoman Empire for over 250 years.
Trade and commerce in the first half of the seventeenth century
flourished, but declined in the last years of the century because of tribal
turmoil and incursions from Algiers. The eighteenth century brought
stability and some prosperity, despite uncertain relations with Algeria and
growing European naval power in the Mediterranean.
The French became especially interested in North Africa following the
Napoleanic Wars. They occupied Algeria and made it a colony in 1830,
causing Tunisia to resist the same fate for the next fifty years. A
deteriorating financial condition, however, forced the Tunisian bey
(commander-governor) in 1869 to accept international financial control by
France, Britain and Italy. As financial collapse appeared imminent in April
1881, French forces invaded. By the Treaty of Mersa in 1 883. a French
protectorate was established over Tunisia and the actual government was
brought under French control.
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D. THE FRENCH PROTECTORATE
The French abolished international control over Tunisia's finances in
1884, and reformed the currency along French lines in 1891. Large-scale
grants of land encouraged settlers to come from France, and also from Italy.
The French tackled the economic problem by developing Tunisia's natural
resources, especially phosphates, for export to European markets.
During its early years as a French colony, Tunisia absorbed many aspects
of French political and cultural life. It was also influenced strongly by
events in other parts of the Islamic world. Inspired by the Young Turk
reformers of the Ottoman Empire, a Young Tunisian movement was
organized in 1908 which called for restoration of the authority of the bey
along with reforms along democratic lines [Ref. 3:p. 6851. Political
consciousness among Tunisians was further stirred by the achievement of
independence by eastern Arab countries after World War I and the example
of the Egyptian nationalist movement. In 1920, the Destour (Constitution)
movement was formed by Shaikh al-Tha'libi, who had earlier been one of
the founders of the pre-war Young Tunisians [Ref. 5:p. 3561.
The Destour Party called for a self-governing constitutional regime with
a legislative assembly. The French took conciliatory action through some
administrative and economic reforms. The radical elements of the Destour
movement were not satisfied and began more aggressive nationalist activity,
causing the French to resort to repressive measures. Shaikh al-Tha'libi was
jailed in 1920 but released in 1921 in order to prevent him from becoming a
martyr [Ref. 6:p. 1 151. He was exiled in 1923, and in 1925 the Destour
movement was broken up under French claims (largely untrue) that it was
15
dominated by Communists IRef 3:p. 685). Attempts to revive the Destour
movement after the Depression railed, its younger members accusing the
older members of collaborating with France. A new and more militant
group, led by young nationalist Habib Bourguiba, formed the Neo-Destour
(New Constitution) Party in 1934 IRef. 3:p. 6851.
E. BOURGUIBAS DRIVE FOR INDEPENDENCE
Born in French Tunisia in 1903, the son of a retired lieutenant in the
Beylical Guard, Habib Bourguiba is sociologically representative of all those
who struggled for independence in North Africa in the middle part of this
century. As a young schoolboy during the period of Tunisian martial law
( 1 9 1 2- 1 92 1 ) and the Italian takeover of Libya (1911), Bourguiba gained
political awareness at an early age. At 19, he joined the then new and
popular Destour Party, two years before he left Tunis for Paris to study law
and political science on limited funds donated by an older brother [Ref. 7:p.
74]. In Paris. Bourguiba developed a close association with the French Left
and began to form his revolutionary ideas.
Returning to Tunis with his French wife and son after five years in Paris,
Bourguiba intended to practice law but found himself discriminated against
in his own country because of his nationality. He was treated as nearly an
equal in French liberal circles, but was looked down upon as a provincial by
the old Tunis families. He became active in nationalist politics almost
immediately, first as a writer for nationalist newspapers and later as
founder of his own newspaper, L Action Tunisienne (still one of Tunisia's
leading dailies).
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In 1934, Bourguiba founded the Neo-Destour (New Constitution) Party,
which deliberately sought conflict with the Protectorate authorities over
issues which it knew would excite the Tunisian population [Ref. 7:p. 79]. As
a result, he and his group of activist friends were thrown into jail by the
Protectorate authorities. Ten of his next twenty years were spent in French
prisons (1934-36, 1938-43, 1952-54) [Ref. 7:p. 751. During these two
decades, Bourguiba fine-tuned his political philosophy and developed the
statesman skills which would permit him to lead his nation to independence.
"Bourguibism," as his political philosophy has been called, was not so
much an ideology as a set of tactics for moving from a colonial situation to
independence. It is based on a belief in democracy and in the moral value of
the individual. For Bourguiba, national sovereignty and independence were
not the ultimate goals, but a step in the development of the Tunisian
individual. The value of independence was that it would permit the
transformation of men into modern citizens more readily than could be
achieved under colonial domination. [Ref. 7:p. 76]
Bourguibism is socialist in that it considers human dignity to be
dependent upon social welfare and economic opportunity. Bourguiba was
too pragmatic, however, to try to apply the theories of Karl Marx to the
Tunisian situation, rejecting Marxism as a doctrine designed only for
industrialized nations. He wrote in 1931, "Tunisia is a country of middle
classes and peasants, those whom the radical represents in France and whom
socialism is trying to capture by battering the brain of Karl Marx." [Ref. 7:p.
76] Bourguiba's Neo-Destourian socialism is really a socially-oriented
nationalism.
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Bourguiba faced a big challenge in presenting his Western ideals to a
largely traditional Muslim society. Believing that one cannot really force a
change, but can only appeal to reason, he applied his best leadership skills to
cause widespread acceptance of his modernist goals. He intended to protect
Islam from Western contamination by selectively borrowing Western values
in the conteit of a modern state system [Ref. 8:p. 29].
The values of human dignity, the perfectibility of man, confidence in
human solidarity, and belief in the supreme power of reason were the
founding principles of Bourguiba s nation and its social harmony. Universal
education was to be the basis of national solidarity and Islam was to be its
social culture [Ref. 8:p. 29].
Bourguiba believed in politics as the art of attaining the possible. In
negotiating, he never took what was offered unless it held the promise of
facilitating further gain. As a means for transforming a protectorate to an
independent nation, Bourguibism proved to be an extremely effective
philosophy.
In prison, Bourguiba continued to attract national attention, and by 1936
his story had captured the imagination of the younger generation. With
highly developed skills as an orator, negotiator and political organizer, his
leadership of the Neo-Destour Party and its drive for independence were
unquestioned. Habib Bourguiba had come to personify the Tunisian
nationalist movement.
The Neo-Destour Party's alliance with the Confederation Generate des
Travailleurs Tunisiens (UGTT), a collection of labor unions, made it the main
mouthpiece of peasant and worker interests. It supported the demands of
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students and put forward generally progressive demands for universal
compulsory education, academic freedom, the development of irrigation, the
application of French labor and social security laws to Tunisian workers, the
nationalization of the key industries, equal pay for equal work without
distinction between Tunisians and Europeans, equal rights for Tunisians and
Frenchmen in land distribution, and unrestricted access for Tunisians to all
administrative jobs iRef 9:pp. 102-03). Bourguibas skillful leadership in
promoting these national and social issues, combined with a limited armed
struggle against French intransigence, led to an offer in 1955 of "internal
autonomy'
1
which implied the gain of only a small portion of the nationalists
demands. Bourguiba, as president of the Neo-Destour Party, agreed to the
offer immediately.
Bourguibas acceptance of the French offer led to a serious conflict within
the party. Salah ben Youssef, the party's secretary-general, felt that
Bourguiba had sold out the party by the "autonomy'' compromise, and he
urged the continuation of the armed struggle [Ref. 10:p. 49). Bourguiba
managed to have ben Youssef expelled from the party and, in response, ben
Youssef declared war on the new government and led his followers in a
campaign of terrorism. He finally fled to Tripoli and was later assassinated
by Tunisian agents in Germany (his murder officially remains unsolved) [Ref.
10:p. 50).
The conflict with ben Youssef helped, rather than hurt, Bourguiba by
causing the French to side with Bourguiba as the more moderate of the two
leaders. In order to ensure that the nationalists were not encouraged to
support ben Youssef, France made further concessions to Bourguiba beyond
19
the promised "internal autonomy; This combination of circumstances
permitted Bourguiba to achieve independence Tor Tunisia on March 20th,
1956, only nine months after he had accepted the offer of "internal
autonomy".
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III. THE ECONOMIC DIMENSION
A. GEOGRAPHY AND CLIMATE
The Republic of Tunisia is a nation still relatively unknown to the
American people. Because of its richer and more powerful neighbors,
Tunisia is all too often overlooked by writers of North African and Middle
Eastern affairs.
Geographically, Tunisia occupies a wedge of North Africa between
Algeria and Libya, jutting northward into the Mediterranean Sea at a point
about midway between Gibraltar and the Suez Canal. It has been a
crossroads between Europe and the Middle East since the beginning of
recorded history.
Tunisia is the smallest country of North Africa, with a land area of
63,362 square miles (163,610 square kilometers) [Ref. 1 l:p. 247] - roughly
the size of Missouri, or of England and Wales together. It has 810 miles
(1300 kilometers) of shoreline [Ref. 12], facing north and east, indented by
three major gulfs—Tunis, Al Hammamat and Gabes. The Atlas Mountains,
which stretch across North Africa from southwestern Morocco, ends abruptly
in northeastern Tunisia. Although the Atlas peaks in Morocco and Algeria
are much higher, they average less than 1000 feet of elevation in Tunisia.
Another mountain chain, the Dorsale (backbone), crosses Tunisia in a
northeasterly direction and plunges into the Mediterranean at Cape Bon.
About one-fourth of Tunisia's land area lies north of the Dorsale range.
Because it receives the heaviest rainfall, this northern section has the
nation's richest soil and highest population density. The ground is generally
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high and the climate characteristically Mediterranean. It is bisected by the
Mejerda River, which flows eastward to the Gulf of Tunis. The Mejerda
Valley contains Tunisia's richest farmland.
The Dorsale range is an unfortunate geographic feature for Tunisia
because it prevents moisture-bearing winds from reaching the southern part
of the country, depriving it of the rain it needs for cultivation. No water-
ways of note exist south of the Dorsale.
Central Tunisia is a region of scanty rainfall and poor soils inland giving
way to a littoral known as the Sahel near the eastern coast. Two inland
subregions are called the High Steppes and the Low Steppes, as elevation
decreases away from Algeria toward the Sahel. Population in the steppes is
sparse, and the land provides only for some pasturing and the cultivation of
a small amount of grain.
The Sahel, which includes the offshore islands of Djerba and Qarqanna,
receives only a little more rain than the steppes, but a heavy dew permits
large-scale cultivation of olives and cereals. Socially, the Sahel is much like
the northern region, with a large population and intense economic and
political activity.
The southern part of Tunisia is dry, low in elevation, and sparsely
populated. Inland are numerous chotts (salt marshes which were probably
once part of the Mediterranean Sea) that lie below sea level, and higher
oases that are surrounded by date palms. Further south are the plateaus
that make up Tunisia's portion of the Sahara Desert. The coast in the
southern region is narrow and fringed with by lagoons and salt flats. The
few residents of this region are traditional nomads or oasis-dwellers.
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B. THE PEOPLE
The population of Tunisia was estimated in 1984 to be 6.9 million, and
the overall density was 109 per square mile (42 per square kilometer).
About 52 percent of the population lived in urban areas, with Tunis by far
the largest city at 1.2 million people [Ref. 1 l:p. 247]. Only four other cities
(Sfaz, Sousse, Bizerte and Kairouan) had over 50,000 inhabitants [Ref. 10:p.
68].
Tunisians are a mixture of Arab and Berber stock. Whereas elsewhere in
northern Africa the indigenous Berbers make up substantial minorities of
the populations, in Tunisia they are represented by only about 2 percent of
the people. About one-half of todays Berbers retain the Berber language of
pre-Arab Tunisia. Small Arab Christian and Jewish communities remain,
along with about 50,000 non-Arab (mostly French) foreigners [Ref. 10:pp.
70-71]. Arabic is the official language, but French is still the principal
language of business.
The overall quality of life for Tunisians is relatively high, closer to that in
Spain and parts of Italy than to that in other developing countries. The
literacy rate is 62 percent, and about 85 percent of the children attend
school iRef. l:p. 587]. Health and sanitation conditions are improving
rapidly, and most serious endemic diseases have been eliminated or are
under control. The civil status of women is almost equal to that of men, and
far higher than in other Arab countries.
Except for the few remaining Christians and Jews, virtually all Tunisians
are Muslims of the "orthodox" Sunni sect (those who follow the Malikite legal
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system). The only other exceptions are on the island of Djerba where about
40,000 of the population adheres to austere Kharijite beliefs.
C ECONOMIC HISTORY
Tunisia's economy has been mostly that of a poor country. It had no
industrial base when it achieved independence, and it is relatively deprived
of natural resources. It does not compete strongly in exports and has a small
internal market. The unemployment rate is high. With little prospect of
generating wealth from its own resources, Tunisia's economy is very much
subject to external forces.
Prior to French colonization, Tunisia had little economic activity.
Agricultural production met grazing and internal consumption needs only,
and the mineral resources were almost unexploited. Primary exports were
religious caps from Tunis and handwoven rugs from Kairouan [Ref . 9:p. 2 1 9].
The French discovered the large phosphate reserves in central Tunisia
and exploited them for export to Europe. In 1 930, Tunisia was the worlds
second largest phosphate producer, and phosphates remain to this day one of
of Tunisia's major exports. The small national railway system was originally
constructed to transport phosphates to Tunis. Also exported during the
French period were iron ore, lead and zinc, but deposits of these minerals
were either small or low-grade and production has fallen off since
independence.
French contributions to agricultural development centered on citrus
fruits, olive oil, wheat and wine— all cultivated in the low and moist coastal
areas.
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The French colonization experience still affects Tunisia's economy, both
positively and negatively. Besides the railway system, most roads, harbors,
and public buildings were constructed during the French period. French
medical knowledge lowered the death rate without changing the birth rate,
greatly expanding the overall population and workforce.
The French did not, however, pay adequate attention to educational
services and training facilities. Seventy-five percent of the population was
illiterate when Tunisia gained independence, leaving the new country
dependent on mostly foreign management iRef. 9:p. 221].
The first few years of independence saw a slow deterioration of the
economy as the French returned with their capital and skills to France.
President Bourguiba was not trained in economics, and his political
preoccupation resulted in a JaJssez-faJre economic policy [Ref. 5:pp. 380-
811. Bourguiba adopted conservative economic strategies which encouraged
a gradual adjustment to the loss of colonial capital and human resources
[Ref. 9:p. 2221.
Although no dramatic economic policies were instituted immediately
after independence, a number of significant social changes were made which
had long-term effects on the economy. In 1956, a Code of Personal Status
was approved which established a minimum legal age for marriage. Other
programs improved the status of women and encouraged family planning.
Combined with improved medical and educational services, the size, quality
and adaptability of the labor force were substantially enhanced [Ref. 9:p.
222J.
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A major change in economic policy did not occur until Ahmed Ben Salah
was made Secretary of State for Planning and Finance in 1 96 1 . His
ambitious plan for the next decade, divided into three- and four-year plans,
set out four objectives for economic and social development: decolonization;
reform of economic structures, including industrialization; human
development, including education, and the fight against unemployment; and
self-development, in order to permit investment from internal resources.
[Ref.5:p. 3811
The Ben Salah's plan identified agricultural reform as the first priority,
and outlined an industrial growth plan that would begin with a few basic
industries like oil refining and steel production. The most significant feature
of his plan was the imposition of a cooperative system in production and
trade. This system was resisted by most farmers and workers, causing it to
end in failure. iRef. 9:p. 222]
Whether the positive aspects of Ben Salah's programs outweighed the
negative is difficult to determine. Tunisia did see a large increase in foreign
aid and loans due to its new political stability. Provision of technical
assistance and teachers from France helped improve the skills of the labor
force, and a number of large projects such as dams, reforestation and soil
conservation were begun. Agricultural production did not increase
substantially, however, and the foreign debt more than quadrupled between
1961 and 1971 IRef. 5:p. 381]. Although commercial and service
employment opportunities swelled with the departure of the French,
migration from rural to urban areas far exceeded the number of jobs
available. By the late 1960s, the cities were centers of high unemployment.
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In 1969, the economic condition was further worsened when a series of
floods destroyed much of the infrastructural development of the past
decade. [Ref. 9:p. 2231
In late 1969, President Bourguiba chose to adopt a more liberal approach
to the economy. He replaced Ben Salah with a team of politicians who
reoriented the Tunisian economy towards a free market system [Ref. 9:p.
223]. The subsequent economic boom is probably due less to the new
policies than to the influence of external forces.
Oil was first discovered in Tunisia in 1966, but production did not reach
a level which permitted export until 1 970. The use of oil as an economic
weapon following the 1973 Arab-Israeli War benefited Tunisia greatly,
although Tunisia was not a member of the Organization of Arab Petroleum
Exporting Countries. Between 1972 and 1974, the value of Tunisia's oil
exports tripled while production remained about the same. [Ref. 9:p. 2241
During the same years, exceptionally good weather in Tunisia
contributed to record levels of citrus and olive oil production. A 1974
increase in world phosphate prices also caused production of that mineral to
reach an unprecedented level [Ref. 10:p. 1481.
Tunisia also reaped benefits from the expanding European economics of
the 1970s. The post-war growth of European industry created labor
shortages, and many Tunisians took advantage of the opportunity for foreign
employment. The resident Tunisian population in France grew from 52,000
in 1965 to about 100,000 in 1970 to nearly 150,000 in 1973 [Ref. 9:pp. 224,
246J. When recession began to hit Europe in 1973, many Tunisians found
work in newly rich Libya.
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Another rapidly expanding sector of the economy in the 1970s was
tourism. The significant efTort which went into creating the tourist industry
was well rewarded in terms of foreign exchange. Direct and indirect
employment as a result of tourism was estimated at nearly 144,000 in 1983
[Ref. 1 l:p. 2461, and the industry accounted for more than twenty percent
of foreign currency earnings in that year [Ref. 10:p. 162).
The European Economic Community (EEC) is where external forces have
worked against Tunisia. Tunisia finds itself severely hindered by the trade
barriers set up by the EEC to protect its members against competition. The
agricultural sector, especially olive oil, was hardest hit because of the
preferential access to European markets given to Italy.
Lastly, a law approved in 1972 gives major fiscal advantages to foreign
companies which invest in Tunisian production principally for export. The
law has resulted in greatly increased levels of foreign investment from
several industrialized nations. [Ref. 1 l:p. 246]
In spite of the attraction of private capital to Tunisia's industrial sector,
industrial output in the 1970s was disappointing. Private investment was
very selective, requiring the government to get involved in order to keep
development relatively balanced. On the whole, the 1970s brought a larger
industrial base, with significant increases in production of building materials,
electrical and metalurgical products, and chemicals. Development of oil
refining capacity matched the increase in oil production. Leather, textile,
and most food and dairy products, however, failed to keep pace with
increasing domestic demand. [Ref. 9:p. 234]
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As the unpleasant experiment of cooperative farming was replaced by a
return to private ownership, the production of the main cereal, citrus and
vegetable crops increased dramatically. Also aided by good weather, the
total value of agricultural production rose 70 percent between 1970 and
1975 IRef. 9:p. 232]. These figures encouraged further investment by both
private and foreign aid organizations, bringing mechanization and irrigation
to Tunisian farmlands.
The agricultural picture was not all rosy, however, as poor weather in
the late 1970s caused a decrease in production of all major crops. Further,
the Western European market for many of Tunisia's food products, especially
olive oil. was reduced as a result of EEC policies. Since 1975, Tunisia has had
a negative balance of trade in food products, with imports costing $180
million more than the value of exports in 1981 [Ref. 9:p. 2341.
In 198 1, 16 percent of the Gross National Product (GNP) came from
agriculture, 29 percent from industry, construction and mining, 33 percent
from commerce and transportation and 4 percent from tourism—indicating a
fairly well-balanced economy. From 1971 to 1981, the GNP showed a
respectable growth rate of 7 percent per year, and the debt service ratio was
only 12 to 14 percent. [Ref. 13:p. 581
In 1982, poor weather and the depressed European economy negatively
affected agricultural production and the market for Tunisian phosphates,
respectively. As a result the GDP growth rate dropped to 1.5 percent and the
debt service ratio rose to 17.5 percent. The growth rate improved to 4.5
percent in 1983. but a poor grain crop and a drop in tourism (the PLO had
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moved its headquarters to Tunis in 1982) raised the debt service ratio to
18.2 percent. The 1983 trade deficit was $1.25 billion. iRer. 13:p. 581
D. THE CURRENT STATE OF THE ECONOMY
Tunisia's economy in the mid-1980s is generally undeveloped.
Relatively prosperous and successful for an African country, its problem now
is in trying to sustain the progress it has made since achieving independence.
The population is expecting continued rapid growth, but it may be
disappointed.
The most serious economic problem of this decade is unemployment.
About 60 percent of Tunisia's 6.9 million people is under the age of 25.
Twenty to twenty-five percent of the active population as a whole is
unemployed or underemployed. Unemployment is running at 30 percent or
more among the 16 to 25 age group. [Ref. 1 l:p. 2451
The government estimates that 40,000 new jobs per year must be
created to keep pace with new arrivals on the labor market during the Sixth
Plan (1982-1986). In 1982 and 1983 the number of new jobs fell short of
the target by several thousand per year [Ref. 1 l:p. 2451. Those who cannot
find employment at home are encouraged to go to Europe, Algeria, Libya or
the Gulf states to find work, the intention being that they should send money
back to Tunisia while they are gone and then eventually return home and
establish employment-creating enterprises. Overseas employment, however,
is also falling short of target. Europe is discouraging employment of
Tunisians because of its own economic problems. Algeria doesn't have many
jobs to fill, the deterioratng political relationship with Libya is causing
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thousands of Tunisians to be sent home, and working in the Gulf region is not
popular with young Tunisians.
Oil remains the biggest earner of foreign currency, with an export figure
of 60,000 barrels per day (out of a total production of 1 10.000 barrels per
day) in 1983. Nearly 90 percent of total oil output comes from two fields,
and both are experiencing a decline in production. Several new fields are
ready for exploration, but no further major oil discoveries are expected. The
outlook for oil revenues is good for the next few years, but Tunisia's internal
consumption will probably match its production capability by the end of the
decade. [Ref. ll:p. 246]
Tourism has become Tunisia's second biggest source of foreign exchange,
behind oil and ahead of expatriate workers' remittances, light industry and
phosphates [Ref. 1 l:p. 246]. Income from tourism has multiplied ten times
in the last decade as a result of a focused government effort, but
opportunities for further growth in the tourist industry are limited. The
number of tourists has not increased since 1982, when 1.4 million visitors
were recorded, and few new hotels or resorts are planned [Ref. 1 l:p. 2471.
Recent efforts to attract investment in light industry have been
moderately successful. About 330 companies, mostly German and French,
have established themselves in Tunisia [Ref. 1 l:p. 246]. They use the
cheaper Tunisian labor to make such products as textiles, tires, paper pulp or
simple electronic parts for re-import into their home countries.
Tunisia remains a major producer of phosphates, and also produces iron
ore, lead concentrates, zinc, salt, and cement for export.
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Agricultural exports include fruit, and olive oil and wine. About 30
percent of the total area of Tunisia is cultivated arable land, and little land is
left for agriculture without irrigation [Ref 1 l:p. 247].
Economic gloom is prevalent in the mid-1980s. The 1984 balance of
payments deficit was $650 million - up 20 percent from 1983. At the start
of 198S, external debt was $3.5 billion (equivalent to half the GNP), pushing
the debt-service ratio to a new high of 25 percent. The only growth
industries are phosphates and phosphoric acids. iRef. 14:p. 51
TABLE 1: TUNISIAN IMPORTS AND EXPORTS (MILLION $US)
1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1983
Imports 466 1128 1529 2138 3526 3438 3100
Exports 315 921 788 1126 2231 I960 1800
SOURCE: [Ref. 15:p. 901
E. ECONOMIC PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT
Tunisia's Sixth Plan calls for economic policies similar to those of the
Fifth Plan, in spite of the problems experienced under that plan. In an effort
to increase the number of available jobs, the largest investment is in services
including tourism. Also emphasized is the creation of mechanical and
relatively sophisticated electrical industries. By early 1984, in fact, eight
automobile and engineering companies had assembly plants under
construction or already operating.2 There is a special effort to attract
American companies, which, it is hoped, will think of Tunisia as a
manufacturing base for the Middle East and North Africa. Only seven or
2 Peugeot, Renault, Daimler-Benz, Volkswagen, Klockner Humbolt Deutz,











eight American companies, however, have shown an interest in investing in
the country iRef. 11 :p. 2461.
TABLE 2: TUNISIAN INVESTMENT FOR THE FIFTH AND SIXTH PLANS





Non-manufacturing Industry 880 21.1
Services (incl. Tourism) 1,509 36.2
(Tourism) (62) (1.5)
Public Services 417 10.0
Total 4,168 100.0
SOURCE: [Ref.9:p. 2351
Tunisia provides both advantages and disadvantages as an industrial
base. It provides corporate tax and customs concessions to form companies
as well as an efficient and uncorrupt bureaucracy and rules which are
administered consistently. Labor is cheaper than in most industrialized
countries, although more expensive than in Egypt, Morocco and the Far East.
On the negative side, wages in Tunisia have risen dramatically in recent
years. The trade unions are powerful and are more concerned with their
working members than with finding jobs for the unemployed. Further,
domestic price controls and very high personal taxes levied on foreign
employees increase the cost of manufacturing in Tunisia. The cost of a
foreign manager to his company in Tunisia are said to be four times normal
Western levels [Ref. 661.
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F. ECONOMIC PROSPECTS
With the governments decision to encourage foreign investment, it lost
much of its ability to determine its own economic future. Tunisia's economic
prospects will be determined mostly be external influences, and many
potential pitfalls exist.
Tunisia cannot continue to rely on oil revenues. Unemployment is an
ever-growing problem. Natural resources are limited, as are markets for
agricultural products.
Further economic development in Tunisia at this point seems to depend
on the country's ability to attract foreign capital in order to create jobs.
Tunisia has been fortunate in that it has not had to devote large amounts of
money to military weapons and equipment; defense spending has averaged
around 3 percent of GNP for several years [Ref. 15:p. 481. An increase in
military expenditures in the last half of this decade would divert Tunisia's
scarce financial resources away from more profitable investment.
The biggest boon to Tunisia's economy over the past three decades has
been its political stability. The steady leadership of President Bourguiba has
reduced economic uncertainty and provided continuity to the course of
development. Bourguiba's death or removal from office will no doubt cause
a period of economic re-evaluation, with a likely result being a reversal of
the trend toward Westernization.
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IV. THE POLITICAL DIMENSION
A. AN OVERVIEW
Tunisia is a rare and unparalleled phenomenon in the contemporary
Middle East. For nearly thirty years since achieving independence, it has
been a model of political stability and social tranquility. Created and led by
President-for-life Habib Bourguiba, Tunisia has resolutely and somewhat
successfully pursued its goals of modernization and economic development.
It has been consistent in both domestic and foreign policy objectives.
Tunisia's political future, however, is not likely to be as tranquil as its past.
Several forces are at work in Tunisian society which threaten its long-term
stability.
President Bourguiba and the small group of elites* which has staffed his
party and his government since independence are beginning to lose their
appeal. The reverence that older Tunisians feel for their national hero is not
shared by those who did not experience firsthand the struggle for
independence.
The emphasis on education and the consequent process of urbanization
have caused traditional family ties and regional loyalties to be weakened.
Young Tunisians, newly educated and urbanized, are finding their upward
mobility blocked by the less-qualified incumbents of elite positions. This
Mn 1980, the 36 members of the Council of Ministers and the Party
Political Bureau formed a closely-knit group. Averaging 53 years of age
(compared to 41 years at independence), these elites are generally well-
educated and from similar social and economic origins. They are
disproportionately drawn from Tunis and the Sahei region. [Ref. 16]
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closed group of aging leaders is no longer able to rally support for its policies
and initiatives, causing some segments of the population to look elsewhere
for ideological satisfaction. Islam is providing these Tunisians, especially the
disenchanted youth, with a solid and tested option in their search for
cultural identity and equality.
Tunisians are also finding themselves caught in the value struggle
between the West and the rest of the Arab world. The historic Tunisian
ability to deal openly as a friend with France, the United States and other
Western powers is deteriorating in the face of prevalent anti-Western
sentiment. Tunisia has even been dramatically drawn into the Arab-Israeli
conflict from which it had remained distant for so many years.
The threats to Tunisian equilibrium are exacerbated by the impending
end of the Bourguiba regime. Although the constitution calls for an orderly
transfer of power to Prime Minister Mohammed Mzali when Bourguiba dies,
it is unlikely that Mzali s transition to chief of state will go unchallenged.
Whoever emerges as Tunisia's next leader will undoubtedly make a show of
cooling relations with the West, as did Egypt's Mubarak in the wake of
President Sadat's assassination.
This, then, is a critical time for Tunisia and for those nations which have
some stock in Tunisia's future. How it deals with the current internal and
external pressures will play a large part in determining whether
Westernization retains any vigor in the Arab world.
B. TUNISIA'S MODERN HISTORY
On 25 March 1956, five days after France formally recognized the
independence of Tunisia, elections were held in which all 98 seats in the
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constituent assembly were won by supporters of the Neo-Destour Party. On
1 1 April Habib Bourguiba became Prime Minister, leading a government in
which 16 of the 17 ministers belonged to the Neo-Destou. Bourguiba
immediately began to consolidate his internal position. iRef. 3:p. 686]
One of Bourguiba's first efforts was to rid Tunisia of the French military
presence. The French were reluctant to leave, however, because of the
deteriorating situation in Algeria. When Bourguiba began to actively support
the Algerian independence movement, friction with France caused him to
break diplomatic relations for several months. In the meantime, Bourguiba
made moves to strengthen relations with Libya and Morocco. In July 1957,
the constituent assembly established the office of the president and invested
Bourguiba with the powers of head of state. [Ref. 3:p. 6861
Although diplomatic relations with France were resumed in early 1957,
the political tension between the two countries in connection with the
Algerian revolt increased. Several French-Tunisian clashes occurred, the
most serious being an attack by French aircraft from Algeria in February
1958. Bourguiba again severed diplomatic relations and demanded the
immediate evacuation of all French bases in Tunisia. At the same time, the
eitraterritorial status of Bizerte, a seaport on Tunisia's northern coast, was
unilaterally abolished. Despite attempts by the United States, Britain and the
United Nations to mediate, the situation worsened until the accession to
power of General de Gaulle in June 1958. By October the only French troops
remaining in Tunisia were in Bizerte, and that city's status was being
negotiated. French-owned transport and electrical services were
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nationalized, and proposals were announced for the purchase of all
agricultural land in Tunisia owned by French citizens. IRef. 3:p. 6861
Freed from his struggle with France, Bourguiba began to concentrate his
efforts on strengthening his personal power. He reformed the party
structure of the Neo-Destour to enhance his authority and began trial
procedures against several political opponents, including his nemesis from
pre-independence days, Salah ben Youssef
.
The trial was evidence of a widening gap between Tunisia and the United
Arab Republic (UAR), from where ben Youssef had been conducting his
political activities. Tunisia had joined the Arab League in October 1958, but
withdrew 10 days later after accusing the UAR (under Nasser) of attempts at
domination. Diplomatic relations were severed the same month on grounds
of Egyptian involvement in a Youssefist attempt to assassinate Bourguiba.
Tunisia's long-awaited constitution was finally promulgated in June
1959. The new constitution, developed under Bourguiba s watchful eye,
legitimized his dominance over the executive, legislative and judiciary
branches of government. In the elections held in November 1959, Bourguiba
ran for president unopposed and all 90 seats in the new assembly went to
the Neo-Destour.
Following a period of improved relations with France, the situation
concerning the French occupation of the military base at Bizerte again turned
sour. The issue came to a head in July 1961, and fighting erupted between
Tunisian and French troops. After more than two weeks of conflict, the
fighting ended with the French in firm control of the Bizerte base. More than
800 Tunisians had been killed. The Bizerte dispute did not end until June
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1962. when the French turned the base over to Tunisia following the March
cease-fire in Algeria. The immediate results of the Bizerte crisis were a
rapprochement between Tunisia and other Arab states, a cooling of relations
with the West and an improvement of relations with the Communist bloc
[Ref.3:p. 687].
In May 1964, Tunisian expropriation of all foreign-owned lands caused
the French to cancel all financial aid. In spite of his now dire financial status,
Bourguiba took advantage of the French act by using it to emphasize
Tunisian independence and socialism. He changed the Neo-Destour's party
name to Parti Sociaiiste Destourien (Destour Socialist Party—PSD). In the
November 1964 elections, Bourguiba was again elected unopposed and the
PSD won all 90 seats in the national assembly. With Bourguiba s dominance
unchallenged and internal political conditions becoming more settled, the
governments attention turned toward economic development. iRef. 3:p. 6871
From 1964 through 1969, economic development efforts, especially the
collective agriculture experiment, dominated Tunisia's internal politics. The
failure of the policies of the Minister of Finance and Planning, Ahmed Ben
Salah, led to his dismissal from government in late 1969. Ben Salah was
tried and sentenced to 10 years' hard labor, but he escaped from prison in
1973 and took refuge in Europe, from where he now leads the radical
opposition group Mouvement d Unite Popuiaire (Popular Unity
Movement—MUP).
Over the next few years, several ministers and political opponents
received harsh treatment as Bourguiba worked to strengthen his grip on the
country. In September 1974, the PSD elected Bourguiba as president-for-iife
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of the party. In the elections of November 1974. Bourguiba again ran
unopposed and all 1 12 PSD national assembly candidates were re-elected.
The assembly amended the constitution to allow for the appointment of a
national president-for-life. and then elected Bourguiba to that position in
March 1975. Additional constitutional reforms, which further increased
presidential authority, were made in December 1975. Nearly all
organizations opposed to the PSD were declared illegal [Ref. 3:p. 688]
Domestic political unrest was evident by 1977, when Bourguiba began to
show signs of poor health. Uncertainty over the future of the Bourguiba-
dominated system of government contributed to popular demands for
political liberation and the development of a multi-party democracy. In
spite of continued government attempts at suppression, several movements
emerged in what appeared to a be a struggle for leadership of post-
Bourguiba Tunisia.
When Mohamed Mzali became prime minister in April 1980, increased
government tolerance of political opposition became apparent. Amnesty was
granted to some imprisoned or exiled opponents, and a few ministers who
had previously been dismissed from their posts were allowed to return to
government. In April 1981, Bourguiba declared that he saw no objection to
the emergence of political parties which rejected violence and religious
fanaticism and were not dependent "ideologically or materially" on any
foreign group (thereby suggesting that the communists and Islamic
fundamentalists still were not to be tolerated). Elections to be held in
November were announced, with the promise that any participating group
40
which received five percent of the votes cast would be officially recognized
as a political party. iRef. 3:p. 6901
July 1981 brought the end to Tunisia's one-party system with the official
recognition of the Parti CommuaJste Tunisien (Tunisian Communist
Party—PCT)—tolerated because it had no connection to the Soviet Union.
Because it had formerly been a recognized party, it did not have to meet the
five percent requirement.
Three parties, including the PCT, opposed the PSD in the November
elections, but the PSD received 94.6 percent of the votes cast and won all
136 seats in the new assembly. No other party received 5 percent of the
vote and none was given official recognition. In the face of formal protests
of electoral irregularities, the Mouvement des Democrates SociaJistes
(Social Democrats—MDS) and MUP were officially recognized in November
1983. [Ref. 3:p. 6901
In local elections held in May 1985. all 3.540 candidates presented on
the PSD list were elected to positions in 245 districts. Although the elections
were officially boycotted by the Democratic Socialists (MDS). the Communist
Party (PCT), the Popular Unity Movement (MUP) and the labor union (UGTT),
as well as by the Islamic Tendency Movement (TMI), 92.84 percent of
eligible voters participated. IRef. 17:pp. 7644-45]
In order to lessen the effect of the decision of the other parties not to
present candidates, the PSD presented twice as many candidates, including
some who were not affiliated with the PSD. According to PSD figures, 70
percent of those elected had not held office before, 50 percent are between
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25 and 40 years old, 33 percent have studied at universities and 14 percent
are women iRef. 17:pp. 7644-451.
The Tunisian public undoubtedly would have preferred a ballot with a
wider choice of candidates, but the large voter turnout and overwhelming
PSD victory indicate continuing confidence in that party. Public support of
the PSD, however, may not be quite as strong as the numbers indicate.
C GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS
The political structure of Tunisia is, and always has been, dominated by
Habib Bourguiba and the PSD. Although other political parties are now
officially recognized, the country remains effectively a one-party system.
The PSD evolved from a large underground movement in the period
immediately following independence. It maintains local-level cells in
villages, city neighborhoods and large economic organizations. The structure
is centralized through regional coordination committees which report to
central committee. Above these is a political bureau, the top leadership of
the party, whose members are appointed by the president. This structure
permits Bourguiba to legitimize (at least nominally) high-level political
appointments and dismissals.
The government administration structure closely parallels the party
structure. It begins at the local level with elected municipal councils in cities
and larger towns and appointed officials in rural areas. The president
appoints regional governors and the interior minister appoints other regional
officials. At the national level, the president appoints ministers, whose
ministries are staffed by a few appointed officials and a permanent civil
service. There is an elected National Assembly whose members run on a
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party list basis. Suffrage is universal adult and secret. The National
Assembly debates and ratifies legislations. Although it can originate laws,
presidential proposals take precedence. When the Assembly is in session,
legislative procedures assure support for governmental proposals before
they are introduced for debate. (Ref. 10:pp. 173-741
Important to the government system is the fact that membership in the
government structure and party leadership almost completely overlap. The
accusation that this system is undemocratic is countered with the argument
that debate, criticism and opposition are permitted within the party
structure—providing both democracy and national unity in a one-party
system.
Most national organizations are affiliated with the PSD, and they actively
support government policies. Strict adherence to the party line, however, is
becoming less common in the current atmosphere of political liberalization.
Appendix C contains a diagram of the Tunisian government structure.
D. THE PASSING OF POWER
The succession to the presidency of Tunisia is now constitutionally
guaranteed, calling for the transition of power to the prime minister. The
new president is to be confirmed by a plebiscite concurrently with the
election of candidates to the National Assembly. Because neither the current,
nor any potential, prime minister possesses Bourguibas charisma or political
leverage, the election will necessarily involve a period of coalition-building.
The Destourian Socialist Party is aging, and may even die, along with its
founder. Prime Minister Muhammed Mzali, who has held his current
position since 1980, is a former university professor who is respected for his
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honesty and intelligence but not his leadership ability. Mzali will assume the
party leadership when Bourguiba dies, but he is not popular among either
the elites or the people [Ref. 8:pp. 35-361. Strongly under Bourguibas
influence. Mzali has had little opportunity to exercise his own political will.
Because of his position, it is probable that he will succeed to the presidency,
but it is unlikely that he will serve that office for much more than a
transition period. He probably signals the end of the Bourguibist era.
Playing an important role in determining who will succeed Bourguiba in
the long term is his second wife. Wassila. who comes from one of Tunis'
wealthiest families. She has long been considered the power behind the
throne, although Bourguiba often goes out of his way to demonstrate his
independence of her. Her power wilt of course, be severely curtailed when
he dies, so she can be expected to use her influence while he is alive to
maneuver someone who is favorably disposed toward her into position to be
his successor. She is not likely to support Mzali and will probably promote
someone from her pet group, the bourgeoisie of Tunis. Her current favorite
is Defense Minister Salah ad-Din Bali [Ref. 18).
B. POLITICAL OPPOSITION
Several political forces have emerged in Tunisia in the past decade. A
brief look at some of the most significant will be helpful
1. The Union Generate des TravaWeurs Tunisiens (General
Tunisian Trade Union—UGTT)
Actually a federation of labor unions, the UGTT claims almost one
million members, making it by far the largest independent national
organization. Although it has a long history of cooperation with the
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government, incidents of disagreement are becoming more frequent and
dramatic. The most significant example was the general strike of January
1978 during which labor activists and government troops clashed, resulting
in many deaths and a level of violence unprecedented in independent
Tunisia. Efforts were made by both sides to ease the tension following the
strike, but the UGTT remains a hotbed of independent thought. The UGTT
leadership is determined to have its own say in the future development of
the country. It clearly supports the socialist option. iRef 9:p. Ill]
2. The Union Generate des Etudiants Tunisiens (General Union of
Tunisian Students-UGTT) .
A student organization founded clandestinely in 1952 under the
auspices of the Neo-Destourians, the UGET has become a voice against some
PSD actions. It has members both in Tunisia and abroad . The UGET has
been responsible for some general campus unrest, but it has not formed a
clear ideology. The composition of the UGET is continually changing as
students graduate, but its former members often move into elite-level
positions in society. Although not currently effective, the UGET is a potential
center of political power. [Ref. 9:p. 1121
3. The Afouvement d'Unit£ PoouMreiVotiUiaT Unity Movement —
MUP)
The MUP is a social democratic movement opposed to the Bourguiba
regime. Led by the exiled Ahmad ben Saiah, former Minister of Finance and
Planning, most of the MUP's supporters live in Europe. The MUP is
supported by socialist and social-democratic parties in Europe, but it
probably is not ready to present its own candidate for Tunisian elections.
[Ref.9:p. 112]
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4. The Social Democrat Party
Led by Ahmed Mestiri. who held several ministerial posts in the
1960s, this is a bourgeois-democratic opposition group whose members
belong to wealthy families. The Democratic Socialists are also supported by
right-wing social democratic parties in Europe, and by bourgeois-progressive
forces. They are prepared to run in an election and may cooperate with
elements in the MUP or right-wing groups of the UGTT. [Ref. 9:pp. 112-131
5. Muhummad Masmudi
Although also representing the bourgeois-democratic forces, Masmudi
has so far refused to cooperate with the Democratic Socialists. He pushes for
strong ties with Libya and Algeria and may form a coalition with any of the
previously listed groups in order to build a broader political base. [Ref. 9:p
1131
6. The Yousseflsts
Operating out of bases in Algeria, these remaining followers of the
"martyred" ben Youssef have political influence greater than their small
numbers would indicate. They are still very much anti-Bourguiba, and have
been accused of being the force behind several violent anti-government
actions. Although not strong enough to advance their own candidate, they
could play a spoiler role in the post-Bourguiba elections. [Ref. 9:p. 1 131
7. The Parti Communiste Tunisien (Tunisian Communist Partv-PCT)
Although never officially banned, the Tunisian Communist Party was
suppressed by the Bourguiba regime from 1963 to 1981. It has little
popular support, but could wield some influence in an alliance with other
progressive movements. [Ref. 9:p. 1 131
46
8. The Mouvement de Tendance Islamiaue (Islamic Tendency
.
.Moyement-TMI)
Probably the most powerful force emerging on the Tunisian political
scene, Islamic revivalism is especially popular with the disenchanted youth.
As the official representative of the popular Islamic revival movement, the
MT1 seeks stricter application of Islamic regulations and customs. They are
promoting themselves as a political party that holds Islam as its ideology.
Additional information concerning the resurgence of Islam follows later in
this chapter. [Ref. 9:pp. 113-141
9. The Army
After twenty-two years of apolitical existence, the army was changed
forever in 1978 when it was used to suppress demonstrators in Tunis and
other parts of the country. The junior officers, especially, question the role
of the army as an instrument to preserve the political status quo, and they
may seek to gain a voice in the government. They remain an uncertain
element in an uneasy situation. [Ref. 9:p. 1 14]
F. RESURGENT ISLAM
Bourguibism has never been hostile to Islam. Bourguiba himself always
fought for the Arab-Islamic character of Tunisia as a dimension of its
national personality. He has, however, continually opposed fundamental
Islam as the central axis of the Tunisian identity. He maintained Islam as a
social culture, but felt that strict observance of Islamic regulations would
impede Tunisia's progress toward modernization. For the first twenty years
of his regime, Bourguibas treatment of Islam received widespread support.
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In the last decade, Tunisian Islamic fundamentalism has experienced a
rebirth. The impulse for this current resurgence of Islam comes from the
grassroots of society, where the social and economic polarization of Tunisia
have called into question some of the basic values of Bourguibism. Because
this brand of Islam is generated by the mass citizenry, it is called al-Islam
as-Sha bi, or Populist Islam. Boiling upward from the deprived, alienated
and frustrated, Populist Islam has now penetrated the middle classes. It is
in direct confrontation with the Islam of President Bourguiba, which is called
aJ-fsJam ar-Rasml, or Establishment Islam.4 Establishment Islam seeks to
preserve the political status quo.
Populist Islam is providing Tunisians, especially the youth, with a solid
and tested option in their search for cultural identity and and social justice
and equality.
In Tunisia, Populist Islam is divided into four major Sunni
fundamentalist movements: the most extreme is the as-Salafi
(traditional/ancestral) movement, which seeks to transform today's society
into a replica of the Muslim society of 1400 years ago; less extreme is the al-
Is/aA (reform) movement, which adheres to basic fundamentalist goals but
recognizes the need to adapt Islam to the modern society; the aJ-Ikwan al-
Muslimeen (Muslim Brotherhood), a contemporary version of the old
Muslim Brotherhood founded in Egypt in 1928, is attempting to appeal to the
*The terms "Populist Islam'* and "Establishment Islam"' are taken from
Bill [Ref. 19:pp. 108-10]. According to BUI, Populist Islam refers to "a
general social and political movement generated from below rather than a
movement sponsored by governments and their supporting bureaucratic
apparatus."
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educated and professional classes in its application of enduring Islamic
principles to the changing world; the fourth group is comprised of Sufi and
other mystical movements. [Ref. 19:p. 1 10]
Although there is tension between the four Sunni groups, they all share
the following basic ideas: a fundamentalist faith in the Quran, the Prophet
Mohammed and the Sunna (tradition); a strong opposition to corrupt and
oppressive government; a commitment to the principles of human equality
and social justice; and, most important to American policy, a condemnation of
external intervention and imperialism in the Middle East [Ref. 19:p. Ill]
While Populist Sunni Islam represents a strong challenge to the political
status quo. it is by necessity tolerated by the Bourguiba government. It is
extremely difficult for any Arab leader to openly oppose Islam in a Muslim
country. Past efforts in Tunisia and other Arab states to suppress religious
leaders seemed only to enhance their popularity.
Instead. Bourguiba is attempting to co-opt the power of the Islamic
movement by re-establishing his credibility as a Muslim leader. He has
already made some concessions such as closing sidewalk cafes during fasting
periods and forbidding topless bathing at public beaches. His moves in this
regard, however are likely to be too little and too late to stem the growing
opposition by Islamic organizations. His token efforts to Islamicize Tunisia
will not correct the social and economic ills which gave strength to the
Islamic movement in the first place.
Further, Bourguiba has external factors which limit his ability to satisfy
restless fundamentalists. His close political and economic associations with
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France and the United States damage his credibility as an anti-imperialist
and weaken his strength and appeal in the process.
America is seen as pro-Establishment Islam, which can only hurt
Bourguiba. The American-Israeli relationship is making all Muslims critical
of the United States and is therefore weakening the legitimacy of Arab
leaders who appear to be pro-American. Bourguiba, in response, is becoming
increasingly critical of U.S. policy toward Israel [Ref. 20]. Such a message
serves only to reinforce the appeal of Populist Islam.
It is probable that the Islamic movement will, if well-organized,
influence the course of events in Tunisia in the coming years. What most
supporters of the Islamic movement want is a return to the traditional
values with which Arabs feel most comfortable. They oppose Westernization
in the belief that it destroys moral values. It is not likely, however, that
Tunisian moderates will permit the excesses carried out in the name of
religion that have plagued some other Arab nations.
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V. THE STRATEGIC DIMENSION
A. AN OVERVIEW
The economic and political interests of the United States in Tunisia are
integral parts of the United States strategic posture in North Africa, the
Middle East, and the Meditteranean Sea. The Tunisian connection is
important to American policy planning for several areas and issues: naval
strategy in the Mediterranean Sea; the Arab-Israeli conflict; the growing
Libyan military threat; and the United States military presence in the region.
In spite of its small size and relatively small population and its
underdeveloped economy, Tunisia is definitely involved in these areas and
issues of American foreign policy. It is impossible to study a map of the
region without becoming aware that any analysis of American long-range
policy goals and options must take into consideration the presence and
politics of Tunisia. The United States cannot afford to consider Tunisia a bit
player in the North African/Middle East theater.
Any long-range strategy toward Tunisia must take into account several
realities.
Tunisia's geographic location places it on the southern shore of a most
important choke point between the eastern and western Mediterranean. The
Straight of Sicily, barely 90 miles wide, is the primary route for travel by
naval combatants and submarines from the Suez Canal or the Black Sea to
the Straight of Gibraltar. Access to Tunisian naval and air facilities, then, is
important to efficient monitoring of marine traffic through the
Mediterranean.
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Tunisia has little military strength of its own and, despite real efforts
towards improvement, is not likely to become a formidable opponent for any
of its neighbors. Tunisia's security will, for the forseeable future, depend
upon outside assistance.
Tunisia's delicate internal political situation requires that U.S. policy
consider potential changes in government in the near future. America
cannot continue to depend upon the forgiving and pro-Western attitude of
the current government.
The opening of the Suez Canal in 1975, after nearly 10 years of
inactivity, gives the Straight of Sicily fresh strategic significance. It is again
an important route for shipment of Middle Eastern oil to Western Europe.
The transfer of large amounts of U.S. military equipment to Tunisia is
causing America to be identified as a primary guarantor of Tunisian security.
U.S. prestige would suffer in the case of a military defeat of Tunisia by Libya
or Algeria.
B. TUNISIA'S GEOPOLITICAL IMPORTANCE
The Mediterranean Sea has been of great significance as a transit route
connecting the three continents which surround it. Its transportation role is
enchanced by its proximity to the Atlantic Ocean, the Black Sea and the
Indian Ocean. Events which occur in any area of the Mediterranean basin
are of importance throughout the region.
With the re-opening of the Suez Canal in 1975 (and the consequent
resumption of oil shipping in the Mediterranean), the growing Soviet Black
Sea fleet, and the increasing potential for terrorist actions against tourist
ships, American interest in the Mediterranean is at its highest level since
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World War II. The trend among North African and Middle Eastern nations in
recent years, however, has been to reduce American military presence in
favor of a more neutral Mediterranean policy. The U.S. has had naval visits
reduced or eliminated in Algeria, Libya, Egypt, Greece and Turkey, while the
Soviet naval presence has increased in Libya, Algeria and Syria. To
compensate, an increased U.S. naval presence in Tunisia would be extremely
desirable.
C TUNISIA'S MILITARY STRENGTH
Tunisia's defense forces consist of 35,100 personnel, or about 0.4 percent
of the population. The Army, by far the largest service, has 30,000 men,
26,000 of whom are conscripts. The Navy's strength is 2,600, while the Air
Force has 2,500. Paramilitary forces include 3,500 in the Gendarmerie and
6,000 in the National Guard [Ref. 21 :p. 86]. Defense expenditures average
less than 10 percent of Tunisia's national budget, and have never amounted
to more than 4 percent of the Gross National Product [Ref. 15 p. 48).
Military personnel are a cross-section of the Tunisian society, socially
stratified according to age, education, and socio-economic background.
Most recruits are draftees who did not get the easily attainable
deferment. They serve for one year. In the army, they receive their basic
training at the regiment in which they will serve. If they chose a military
career, they will normally be assigned permanently to a regiment in their
home region. About half of the recruits perform menial duties for their
entire period of service, including tending the regimental sheep and orchards
and constructing buildings in the regiments area. [Ref. 22:pp. 610-11]
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The noncommissioned officers (NCOs) are career soldiers. Currently, an
age and experience sap divides the NCO corps into two groups: one older
group that fought with the French and has little formal education; and one
younger group with a higher educational level
The officer corps is comprised of both careerists and draftees. The
draftees generally serve one year as platoon commanders or as specialists in
areas where the Army has shortages (such as doctors or engineers). Most of
the draftees return eagerly to civilian occupations when their military
service is completed. Career officer assignments are dictated by the Defense
Ministry, with all key staff and field grade command appointments approved
by President Bourguiba. Most post-independence career officers received
their training overseas at Frances Saint Cyr Academy or in the United States,
although the Tunisian Military Academy at Fondouk Djedad is now producing
some of its own officers. iRef. 23:p. 586]
The career officer corps is, like the NCO corps, divided into two groups.
Again, the older officers are less educated and more traditionally pro-
Western.
Tunisia's military equipment is a mixture of old and new, most of it from
Western countries. Combat aircraft, tanks, frigates and surface-to-air
missiles (SAMs) have been transferred from the United States; tanks,
helocopters and naval vessels from France; artillery and patrol craft from
Graet Britain; trainer aircraft, armored personnel carriers (APCs) and small
arms from Italy; trainer aircraft and SAMs from Sweden; light tanks from
Austria; and small arms from Belgium. Additionally, patrol boats were
received from the People's Republic of China. IRef. 23:p. 587]
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Military financial aid is received from the United States and Saudi
Arabia, and Tunisia had military trainees abroad in the U.S.. France and
Egypt Tunisia does not export any military hardware, but there are reports
that some arms have been provided to the PLO since that organization
established its headquarters near Tunis in 1982 iRef. 24:p. 2141.
Appendix D contains tables of Tunisian military personnel and weapons.
D. THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY
The Tunisian military forces are unique in the Arab world in that they
are apolitical, very professional, and have never mounted a coup or
fomented revolution against the government. The Tunisian military
establishment, in President Bourguiba's view, should be primarily a school of
civics to guarantee the survival of Tunisian nationalism. Until recently, the
size and quality of armaments was limited in order to remove any
temptation to intervene in affairs of state. The military is not permitted
political associations. Bourguiba has carefully maintained the purity of the
military and the military has, in return, been extremely loyal to him.
In all, the Tunisian military has admirably served its role as defender of
Tunisia's national integrity and political stability. This is not to say,
however, that there are no differences of opinion within the military or
between the military and political leadership.
In January 1978, the Tunisian labor union called for a general strike and
went into the streets of Tunis to protest the policies of the government. In
its first internal supression role, the army quickly represseed the strike, but
several people were killed (the official count is 47, but unofficial reports put
the total as high as 200) [Ref. 9:p. 1091.
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In January 1 980, a band of about 60 guerillas opened fire on the police
station and military barracks in the central Tunisian mining town of Gafsa
Military forces were again called out, and it took several days and many
casualties to overwhelm the rebels.
Since 1980, the military has been utilized in a police role during periods
of university student and general civil unrest.
This increasing use of the army as a repressive force has created
dissention between the junior and senior officer ranks. The senior officers,
who have been with the regime since before independence, generally accept
their role as protectors of Bourguiba's regime without question. The junior
officers are beginning to look for alternatives that will satisfy the needs of
Tunisia without adhering blindly to Bourguiba. The post-Bourguiba military
is likely to rebel against being used for internal repression, and it will
probably lose some of its hegemony in the face of resurgent Islamic
fundamentalism, a critical eiamination of pro-Western values and differing
attitudes toward the threat from Libya.
E. THE U.S.-TUNISIAN MILITARY CONNECTION
The US -Tunisian relationship in the past was built largely on American
aid for Tunisia's economic development and on surplus food shipments.
Between 1962 and 1979, the U.S. provided Tunisia with an average of $8
million per year in military aid but $38 million per year in food and
economic aid [Ref. 4:p. 1211. After Reagan's election, however, foreign
military sales (FMS) credits were multiplied from the 1981 budget amount
of $15 million lo$95 million in 1982 [Ref. 4:pp. 125-261. The 1984 and
1985 FMS credits were $92 million and $50 million, respectively, with $52
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million requested in the 1986 budget U.S. military aid since 1982 is part of
a program which could cost Tunisia more than SI billion in the neit few
years for the purchase of F-5E fighters, M-60 tanks and anti-aircraft
weaponry [Ref. 251.
In return, the United States is acquiring access to Tunisian air and naval
facilities. The details of Americas wartime access rights have been kept
quiet, but the peacetime presence of Siith Fleet ships in Tunisian ports is
increasing annually. Some observers contend that Washington has obtained
use of Tunisian airspace and ground facilities in the event of a Soviet-
supported conflict involving Algeria, Libya, and Egypt [Ref. 14:p. 126].
Increased Soviet naval presence in Libya and Algeria, combined with the
uncertain U.S. position in Egypt and Greece, makes standby facilities in
Tunisia desirable.
While entering into military and economic agreements with the United
States. Bourguiba has been careful to maintain his distance in public. He is
even said to be considering a Soviet offer of arms that would match the
American program, but Washington is not overly concerned about the
possibility of Bourguiba accepting Moscow's proposal [Ref. 4:p. 130].
TABLE 3: UNITED STATES MILITARY AID TO TUNISIA
(UNIT: THOUSAND U.S. DOLLARS)
1984 1986 1986
(Actual) (Estimate) (Budget)
Foreign Mil. Sales (Guar.) 92,000 25.000 26,000
Foreign Mil. Sales (Grant) 25,000 27,000
Mil. Assist. Program 1 8,000 1 5,000 1 6,000
Intnatl Mil. Educ. and Trng. 1.621 1.550 1.700
Total 101,621 66,550 70,700
SOURCE: [Ref. 2:pp. 662, 669, 676]
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VI. TIW1S1 AS FOREIGN POLICY
A. TUNISIA'S NEIGHBORS
Tunisia's relationship with its neighbors is largely a function of their
relations with each other. When Algeria and Libya move closer together
politically, relations between each of them and Tunisia deteriorate. A
rapprochement between Tunisia and either one of its neighbors tends to
isolate the other. In this political climate, Tunisia is very concerned about
which way its neighbors are drifting.
1. Libya
The issue of Bourguiba's successor is closely connected with the debate
over how closely to align the Tunisian government with the United States.
American military aid is seen as a show of support for Bourguiba, so his
opposition can be eipected to take an anti-U.S. platform. Important to the
question of how much aid to accept from Washington is the Tunisian
perception of the threat posed by Libya's Colonel Qadhafi.
The 1980 insurgency in Gafsa was blamed to a large extent on Libya.
Several border incidents and a few small Tunisian uprisings have been
perpetrated by Libya since then. More recently, in September 1985, reports
from Cairo indicate that a coup in Libya was attempted in response to
Qadhafi directing his army and air force to invade Tunisia iRef. 26].
Libyan designs on Tunisia are uncertain, but Qadhafi has considerable
potential for causing further trouble. About 50,000 Tunisians are employed
in Libya, although 27,000 more were recently expelled (Tunisia evicted 283
purported Libyan spies and broke off diplomatic relations in response) [Ref.
271. Additionally, Qadhafi is giving military training to an estimated 5,000
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Tunisians, ostensibly to prepare them to liberate Palestine, but perhaps to
liberate Tunisia instead iRef. 13:p. 60]. When returned to Tunisia, these
military personnel will be in a good position to stir up internal dissention on
Qadhafis behalf, if they are so inclined.
Qadhafi. if reports of his recent failed attempt to invade Tunisia are
correct, is not likely to launch another attempt soon. He faces growing
unrest at home and his position with the Organization of African Unity is
questionable. He has already earned the disapproval of most African states
for his adventure in Chad and his stance on the Western Sahara issue, and a
military takeover of Tunisia would probably lead to political isolation.
After two brief mergers with Libya in the early 1970s, relations
between Tunisia and Libya became strained over several issues. In the mid-
1970s, Libya opposed Tunisia's policy on the Western Sahara and began
expelling several thousand Tunisian workers. Soon thereafter, Bourguiba
announced the arrest of a Libya hit team sent to kill top Tunisian officials.
Bourguiba later claimed that Libya was providing military training for
opponents of his regime IRef. 10:p. 2121. Relations between the two
countries were further strained by a disagreement over the maritime
territorial boundaries in 1977.
2. Algeria
Tunisia's relationship with Algeria is basically one of mutual mistrust.
Tunisia contributed significantly to the Algerian war of independence, but
the two countries had a dispute over territory soon after Algeria's
independence was achieved. Through the 1960s, both countries harbored
opponents of the others regimes, but formal political and economic relations
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were generally friendly. A mutual desire to prevent superpower control of
the Mediterranean Sea led to a series of agreements in the 1970s. iRef. 10:p.
213J
Algeria, however, considers the disposition of Tunisia a matter of basic
security. An independent Tunisia is tolerable, but a Tunisia controlled by
Libya would be a serious threat to Algeria's struggle for supremacy in North
Africa. Algeria would prefer to control Tunisia in order to utilize it as a
buffer zone against Libya aggression. Tunisia, aware of its precarious
situation, has adopted a policy of rapprochment with Algeria. A 1983 pact of
friendship and cooperation between Algiers and Tunis warmed relations
officially, but Tunisia remains wary of Algerian intentions. Some commercial
agreements, including an arrangement for an Algerian oil pipeline to cross
Tunisian territory, have been signed, and Algeria is among the largest
suppliers of tourist income for Tunisia.
B. THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT
Tunisia has been a consistent supporter of the rights of Palestinian
Arabs, but the Bourguibist idea of how Palestinians should achieve autonomy
differs significantly from the prevailing Arab view. Bourguiba appears to
the West to be a moderate on the Palestine issue.
In 1947, Tunisia advocated acceptance of the United Nations resolution
which sanctioned the partition of Palestine into Arab and Jewish states.
Although this concept was initially rejected by all other Arab states, it has
since become central to many of the peace plans proposed by Arab leaders.
In 1965, after a tour of Palestinian refugee camps in other Arab countries,
Bourguiba called upon the Arabs to negotiate a settlement with Israel. He
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believed that the Arabs could not win a conventional war with Israel
because of its American support. He offered the case of Tunisia's struggle for
independence, in which a step-by-step method was employed, as an example
for the Palestinians to follow. Bourguiba also made clear his view that only
the Palestinian Arabs themselves could determine their future, assisted, but
not dominated, by other Arab countries. [Ref 10:pp. 214-151
The gap between Tunisia and the other Arab countries was closed when
Tunisia organized a military force to fight with the Arabs in the June 1967
war. The Tunisian force did not see action, but the gesture was appreciated.
In the October 1973 war, Tunisia contributed a small military contingent,
medical teams and other material assistance to the Arab cause. His
commitment to a negotiated settlement, however, was unchanged.
Tunisia joined the other Arab nations in condemning the 1979 Egypt-
Israeli peace treaty as damaging to Arab unity.
Bourguiba has consistently condemned attacks on the PLO by any party.
In July 1973, he called on King Hussein to relinquish his throne and convert
Jordan to a Palestinian state. In 1976 he criticized Syria for attacking PLO
units in Lebanon. The 1978 and 1982 Israeli attacks on PLO bases and
civilian refugee camps were strongly denounced by Bourguiba. With the
encouragement of the United States, Bourguiba offered Tunis as a new
headquarters for the PLO after its forced evacuation from Beirut in
September 1982.
Since 1982, Tunisia has reportedly provided the PLO with some material
and weapons support iRef. 24:p. 214], but still has not changed its basic
view of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Even the Israeli raid against the PLO
61
Headquarters near Tunis on October 1, 1985, which killed several Tunisian
civilians and outraged the general population, did not change the official
Tunisian advocacy of exchanging peace for return of occupied territories [Ref
.
201.
C THE ARAB LEAGUE
The League of Arab States, or Arab League, is the most general
organization for inter-Arab cooperation. It is a loose association of Arab
states which grew out of a series of World War II proposals for Arab unity
[Ref. 3:p. 198]. Membership has grown over the years to the present 21
member states. Palestine is considered an independent state by the League
and the PLO, as its official representative, was given full membership status
in 1974 [Ref. 28]. The Arab League headquarters was "temporarily"
withdrawn from Cairo and established in Tunis following the 1979 Egyptian-
Israeli peace treaty.
Decisions and agreements by the Arab League carry little weight, as they
are binding only to the members that accept them. Expulsion from the
league or action against aggression does not require the approval of the state
against which it is directed. Amendments to the pact require only a two-
thirds vote, but an objecting member may withdraw from the organization at
any time. [Ref. 3:p. 1981
The primary value of the Arab League is as a forum for discussion of
matters that affect the Arab world as a whole in order to give the
appearance of unity of thought. Individual slate sovereignty, however, is a
principle that is enshrined in the pact. [Ref. 3:p. 198]
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Tunisia did not join the Arab League until 1958, and then it boycotted
league meetings until 1961 because of a dispute with Egypt. With the Arab
League, Tunisia has generally allied itself with the conservative oil states.
The relocation of the Arab League headquarters to Tunis has given Tunisia
increased visibility and prestige in the league, although its official status
remains as before. The Secretary General of the League, elected for a five-
year term in 1980, is Tunisian Chedli Klibi [Ref. 3:p. 199].
D. WESTERN EUROPE
Tunisia's historical, cultural and economic ties to Western Europe,
especially he southern countries, are eitensive. Tunisia, as a Mediterranean
state, considers its security to be closely linked to the security of Western
Europe.
1. France
Tunisia's closest ties to Europe are with its former colonial power.
Bourguibas efforts to achieve independence under friendly terms were
frustrated by his desire to aid Algeria in its struggle against France, but the
break in Franco-Tunisian relations was soon repaired. Except for some crises
of short duration, relations with France have remained very positive.
Tunisia receives economic aid from France,5 and most of Tunisia's
military hardware is of French origin. Tunisia sends some military personnel
to France for training.
5ln 1982, France donated 1.5% of its Official Development Assistance
(ODA) funds to Tunisia, equalling $6.05 million of France's ODA total of
$4,034 billion [Ref. 29].
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In 1983. France was Tunisia's second largest market for exports
(behind the United States), and France remains the largest supplier of
Tunisian imports iRef. l:p. 5871.
The French language still prevails for commerce and diplomacy,
causing France's influence in Tunisia to remain strong. Tunisian diplomats
and political leaders, because of their education and intellectual orientation,
tend to be sympathetic to French foreign policy. Commercially, the strong




The Italy-Tunisia relationship has had its problems. The two
countries are competing with some of the same products (especially olive oil)
for European markets, but Italy is given preferential treatment. Arguments
over fishing rights in the Strait of Sicily, assaults on Tunisian laborers in
Italy, and the involvement of an Italian oil rig in a Tunisian-Libyan maritime
border dispute have further damaged relations. Several commercial and
diplomatic agreements do exist between the two countries, however, and
they have a number of security interests in common. On the whole,
relations between Tunisia and Italy are cordial, if not especially friendly.
IRef. 10:p. 218]
E. THE UNITED STATES
Tunisian-American relations have been consistently cordial since Tunisia
achieved indepedence, due largely to the substantial amounts of economic
and military aid which Tunisia receives from the United States. President
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Bourguiba. mindful of his need for a strong ally, has been careful not to
endanger the U.S.-Tunisian friendship/
Tunisia does not subscribe to the prevailing Third World opinion that the
United States is an imperialist power. It believes that America is a
necessary party to any Arab-Israeli peace negotiations because only the
United States can be persuasive with Israel. In this regard, President
Bourguiba is disappointed in Americas continued strong support of Israeli
policies. He has urged the U.S. to talk directly with the PLO. In spite of the
disagreement over the Arab-Israeli issue, however, official relations
between America and Tunisia are very close.
Even the October 1985 Israeli attack on PLO headquarters in Tunisia, and
the subsequent announcement by Washington that Israels action was a
"legitimate response," did little to harm Tunisia's official policy toward the
United States. The Bourguiba government called the raid "a positive test of
Tunisia's international policy, since the earthquake which shook U.S.-Tunisia
relations rocked the building but left its foundation intact". [Ref. 20]
F. COMMUNIST COUNTRIES
1. The Soviet Union
Tunisia did not establish relations with the USSR until 1960, when
Bourguiba became disappointed with NATO policies. Since then, the Soviet
Union has provided Tunisia substantial economic and technical assistance,6
6Most of the Soviet aid has been for water development projects. Adam
on the Mejerda River was built using $55 million of 1976 credits. Total
Soviet aid to Tunisia for the period 1954-1978 was $96 million (compared
to $716 million for Algeria). [Ref. 30:pp. 7, 211
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and Tunisia provided the use of harbor facilities at Bizerte to Soviet ships in
return. Despite fundamental ideological differences and a 1973 Tunisian
accusation of Soviet espionage activity, relations between the two countries
have remained generally good.
Since the late 1970s, Tunisia has become concerned over the
increased Soviet presence in the Mediterranean Sea. As a show of
dissatisfaction, and in response to a request by the United States, permission
to use Tunisian ship repair facilities in Bizerte was withdrawn. [Ref. 10:p.
2191
The Soviet Union has no military technicians or advisors in Tunisia,
nor do Tunisian military personnel train in the Soviet Union. Some Tunisian
academic students are trained in the Soviet Union. [Ref. 30:p. 17]
2. China
Tunisia maintains diplomatic ties with the People's Republic of China.
Tunisia refuses to get involved in the Sino-Soviet dispute, preferring to
remain on cordial terms with both countries. Tunisia has received some aid
from China7 and has purchased two gunboats from the PRC. [Ref. 10:p. 2 191
3. Others
Tunisia has good relations with many communist countries in Eastern
Europe and Asia. In 1984, Tunis had diplomatic ties with Poland, Bulgaria,
Romania, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Yugoslavia and Vietnam. Tunisian ties
with communist countries, while not close, have resulted in numerous
TTotal Chinese aid for the period 1954-1978 was $40 million, all in 1972.
Additionally, China is constructing the Mejerda-Cap Bon canal under $90
million of Chinese agreements. [Ref. 30:p. 7]
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commercial and technical agreements. Tunisia received a total of S2 10
million in economic aid from Eastern European communist countries during
the period 1954-1978 [Ref. 30:p. 71.
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VIL UNITED STATES POLICY GOALS AND OPTIONS
United States interests in Tunisia are diverse and complicated. In light
of recent events, the historical American-Tunisian relationship must now be
re-evaluated and faced squarely by U.S. policy planners. Further, American
policy in Tunisia must be communicated to and understoood by Tunisian
officials if we intend that Tunisian actions will be based in part on the
response they will bring from Washington. Once announced, American
policy must be followed consistently in order to build and sustain confidence
that Washington in fact knows what its interests are.
American long-range policy goals in Tunisia fall into the three broad
categories discussed previously in this study; economic, political and
strategic. Policy goals and options must not, of course, be treated as one all-
encompassing entity. For the purposes of this study, however, American
interests will first be separated into the three broad dimensions. Overall
American policy will be reviewed in the concluding chapter.
A. THE ECONOMIC DIMENSION
The United States believes that a strong and economically viable Tunisia
will be a force of stability in an unstable region. Tunisia considers itself a
model for the Third World of how an undeveloped country, with Western
assistance, can reach a respectable level of economic performance. Both
countries are aware that Tunisia, as a presentable example of how American
support can enhance a nation's economic experience, improves the
international image of the United States. Tunisia has never acted as an
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American satellite, but the United States finds itself nevertheless compelled
to support Tunisia. Americas economic goal in Tunisia is the same as
Tunisia's own goal—that of a strong and self-sustaining economy.
The United States benefits little from close economic ties to Tunisia.
Except for phosphates and a very limited amount of oil, Tunisia has little that
America needs or wants. Any American economic involvement with Tunisia
is likely to be extremely one-sided.
Tunisia's own economic interest lies in developing its industrial sector.
It has become evident that Tunisia cannot finance its own development
under current world and regional economic conditions, so it must solicit aid
and investment from outside sources. The Arab Gulf states and the West,
especially the United States, are Tunisia's most likely benefactors.
The United States can best assist Tunisia by providing both aid for
development and markets for Tunisia's products. Tunisia is not now on the
list of countries with priority for assistance because the per capita income
exceeds one thousand dollars annually, but it is obvious that Tunisia needs
economic aid. Tunisian debt payments are already more than the affordable
limit, so American aid is best extended in the form of grants through the
Economic Support Fund (ESF) and Food for Peace (RL. 480-I/II) programs.
U.S. economic and food aid (including Peace Corps) programmed in recent
years ($19.2 million total in 1984, $27.2 million in 1985, and $26.5 million in
1986) is substantial but not huge [Ref. 2:p. 662,669,676]. It does little to
make up for the annual trade deficit of over a billion dollars.
Tunisia, in its continuing search for real independence, desires to lessen
its economic dependence upon the United States. Relations between the two
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countries, in the Tunisian view, should not be "in terms of material interests
but on the highest level of responsibility" (Ref. 201 in order to give Tunisia
more influence in its dealings with Washington and permit greater freedom
of action. Tunisia realizes, however, that acheiving economic independence
is not possible without a good deal of aid along the way.
American economic options in Tunisia are few. In order to assist Tunisia
without contributing to the undesirable condition of economic dependence,
the flow of development aid must continue. The primary question is: how
much aid is enough without being too much? The current level is certainly
inadequate, and it is probable that Tunis would willingly accept a
substantially higher amount. Further, whatever amount is provided must be
reasonably consistent from year to year (money is spent most efficiently
when it can be included in budget planning) and it must be provided without
attached "strings." Attempts to exchange economic assistance for political
compliance are likely to be rejected out of principle, with destructive effects
for both parties.
B. THE POLITICAL DIMENSION
Despite much debate over specific American interests in North Africa
and the Middle East, there is general agreement on broad American policy
goals; limiting Soviet influence, maintaining regional peace, supporting Israel,
and promoting economic and social development. The American political
relationship with Tunisia must be developed within the framework of these
basic goals.
U.S. political goals in Tunisia are: an independent and secure Tunisia;
continuation of Tunisia's moderate policies in Arab affairs; enhancement of
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Americas political image in Tunisia and the North Africa/Middle East region.
Americas real political interest in Tunisia lies in the fact that a strong U.S.-
Tunisia relationship will bolster Americas image in other moderate Arab
countries.
American policy in Tunisia must be rational, intelligent and enduring.
The uncertainty over who will replace President Bourguiba means that U.S.
policy must be flexible enough to adapt to whatever changes in leadership
occur. America must avoid a heavy-handed approach to Tunisia as any
high-profile policy is likely to be counterproductive.
Four important political considerations must be made in developing U.S.
policy toward Tunisia. First, the United States and Tunisia are
fundamentally opposed over Americas support of Israel in the Arab- Israeli
conflict, with little chance of either country changing its basic viewpoint on
the issue. Second, the United States is unlikely to have any real influence
over who emerges as Bourguiba's successor. Third, any perceived
involvement by the United States in Tunisia's internal affairs will play into
the hands of anti-American factions. Fourth, the U.S. position in Tunisia was
badly damaged by Washington's initial approval of Israel's October 1985 air
strike against the PLO headquarters near Tunis. Officially, however, Tunis
seeks to mend the relationship because it recognizes America's unique
ability to assist in the modernization of Tunisia.
American political options in Tunisia are few. Washington must ally
itself with Tunisia whenever possible, and must avoid appearing to treat
Tunisia as a subordinate nation. Tunisia recognizes that it is not a major
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voice in world events, but considers itself too important to be ignored in any
treatment of North African or Middle Eastern affairs.
American promises, once made, must be kept. In June 1985, during a
visit by Bourguiba to Washington. President Reagan pledged American
backing for Tunisia's security and territorial integrity8 . Less than four
months later, Reagan publicly approved of a violation of Tunisia's territorial
integrity by Israel9 . Although the original pledge had been made in the face
of threatening Libyan, and not Israeli, activity, the damage to America's
political credibility was significant.
Many Tunisians still feel that Libya is Tunisia's most immediate threat,
but they resent American actions which further widen the Tunisia-Libya
gap. The United States must not attempt to use Tunisia as a base for anti-
Libyan activity, but the pledge to assist Tunisia in the event of Libyan
aggression must be honored.
8At the time of Bourguiba's visit, President Reagan said that the United
States "remains firmly committed to the sanctity of Tunisia's territorial
integrity and to the principle of non-interference in its internal affairs." He
also said that "Tunisia can rely on the close friendship and cooperation of the
United States." iRef. 32]
9Immediately following the 1 October 1985 Israeli air strike against PLO
headquarters near Tunis, President Reagan called the raid "a legitimate
response and an expression of self-defense." IRef. 32] On the following day,
the White House called the raid "understandable as an expression of self-
defense," but said "such acts of violence are contrary to our overall objective
of a peaceful, stable, Middle East and cannot be condoned." [Ref. 331 Later
the U.S. abstained from a United Nations Security Council vote to condemn
the raid and sent Undersecretary of State John Whitehead to Tunisia to mend
damaged relations.
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C THE STRATEGIC DIMENSION
Strategically, Tunisia is of increasing importance to the United States. Its
geographic location in relation to Mediterranean Sea routes and to the rest of
the troubled North Africa/Middle East region ensure that the U.S. has a
long-term interest in maintaining access to Tunisian naval and air facilities.
The uncertainty over who will succeed President Bourguiba and his PSD,
however, makes the question of how strongly the U.S. should pursue close
ties a difficult one. The struggle between pro-Western factions and their
anti-American opponents may come to a head over the issue of U.S. military
aid.
The real strategic goals of the United States in Tunisia are few. They
are:
(1) To obtain and maintain increased access to Tunisian naval and air
facilities;
(2) To deny the use of Tunisian facilities to the Soviet Union;
(3) To enhance regional stability by deterring Libyan and/or Algerian
aggression.
All of the above goals are best accomplished by a close U.S.-Tunisian
military relationship. The Tunisian armed forces are now woefully
inadequate to repulse a large-scale invasion of their national territory. They
lack enough fighter aircraft, tanks and transport aircraft to meaningfully
engage an invading force in the skies or on the ground. With no modern air
defense network in place in Tunisia, the enemy would probably have both
strategic and tactical surprise. Building a modern and powerful fighting
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force capable of countering a large invasion force, however, is far beyond the
means of the Tunisian economy.
With little ability to defend itself, Tunisia has effectively placed its
national security in the hands of its largest and most powerful ally, the
United States. Tunisia knows that it will not become a major power in the
region and does not intend to try. In the words of an official Tunisian
spokesman, "Small and medium size countries which play at using military
force have all failed, because the military strength does not belong to them.
One can at most resort to it to support political and moral strength".
[Ref. 201
What Tunisia does want militarily is a force strong enough to discourage
small-scale "adventures" into Tunisian territory by its neighbors. Even this
limited military objective requires a more effective fighting force than
Tunisia now has. The United States must be willing to Tunisia provide
Tunisia with increased military assistance in order to retain its position as
the primary guarantor of Tunisian security.
In recognition of Tunisia's eiisting economic burdens, American military
aid should be provided free of charge or sold under generous terms. The
1981/1982 American policy of selling arms as part of a program which
obligates the Tunisians to increased purchases in future years should be
abandoned.
American military assistance and weapons should be part of an
agreement which guarantees access by the United States to Tunisian naval
and air facilities in time of need. The American military presence in Tunisia
should be strictly limited, however, under normal conditions. Training of
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Tunisian military personnel should be conducted to the extent possible in the
United States. Combined U.S.-Tunisian military eiercises should occur
frequently, but in a low-profile manner. Visits to Tunisian ports by ships of
the American Sixth Fleet should occur no more often than quarterly, and
their crews should be encouraged to conduct as many civil action projects as
possible when in port.
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Vlll. CONCLUSION
Tunisia is not, and is not likely to become in the near future, a burning
issue for Amreican policy makers. Its importance in North African and
Middle Eastern regional affairs is, however, increasing. The policies America
has followed for the past several years are no longer appropriate.
For the American-Tunisian relationship to function effectively and
predictably, it must be based on a mutual understanding of the long-range
interests of each country. As individual and independent nations, both the
United States and Tunisia will act to maximize their own national interests.
This study has attempted to show that, despite some irreconcilable
differences, the two countries have several important interests in common.
The mutual interests can best be served in an atmosphere of clearly and
openly defined policies.
Tunisia is the smallest country in the region, endowed with few natural
resources but inhabited by people who have a realistic and relatively
modern attitude towards life. By catering to Western investment and
tourism, they have created an economy that serves as a model for
developing nations. The population is more cosmopolitan than that in most
Arab countries because of its long exposure to foreign influences.
Modern-day Tunisa is largely the creation of one man, Habib Bourguiba.
Since he led the nation to independence in 1956, he has ruled with such
complete authority that his regime has been called a "presidential
monarchy." [Ref. 10:p. 1831 The economic successes and political stability
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that Tunisia has experienced over the past 30 years are due mostly to
Bourguiba's vision and leadership.
Bourguiba s authority is implemented by his Destourian Socialist Party
(PSD), led now by essentially the same men who were at Bourguiba's side
during the struggle for independence. This aging group has lost much of its
appeal, especially among the young people who see their opportunities for
advancement as limited. Bourguiba himself, the charismatic folk hero who
was revered by his countrymen for so many years, is becoming too feeble at
age 82 to maintain a firm grip on the nation.
Tunisia's one-party government, considered by many to be an ideal
blend of socialism and democracy, officially came to an end in 1981, when
opposition parties were allowed for the first time to present candidates for
elected office. Restrictions on the publishing of opposition newspapers were
eased at about the same time. In spite of the apparently freer political
climate, however, suppression of real opposition continued that the one-
party system endured in practice.
Habib Bourguiba, in spite of his weakening mental and physical
condition, will remain the dominant political figure in Tunisia until he dies or
hands over his presidency. The constitution directs the transfer of power to
his prime minister, Muhammed Mzaii, but it is unlikely that Mzaii will be
permitted to assume the presidency without a fight. The opposition, both
inside and outside the PSD, is already lining up its support for the power
struggle that is sure to take place.
Whoever emerges on top will undoubtedly adopt a stance that is less
pro-Western than was Bourguiba's. Tunisia can be expected to align itself
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more with mainstream Arab political views, taking a stronger stand against
the United States-Israel partnership in the process. The interests that
Tunisia shares with the United States, however, will not be affected by the
change of leadership. Despite some predictions of a Lebanon-like turmoil
following Bourguiba's death, it is unlikely that the Tunisian people will
permit a long or violent period of power transition. Although they may
incorporate more Islamic values into their daily lives, they are also unlikely
to abandon their basic Western orientation. Whoever leads Tunisia after
fiourguiba will find himself inextricably connected to the United States—
economically, politically and militarily.
Tunisia's only neighbors are Algeria and Libya. Algeria is greatly
superior militarily due to its much larger population and oil income. It has
close military ties to the Soviet Union. Libya is also superior in military
strength to Tunisia, by virtue of oil revenues which have permitted huge
expenditures on military equipment. Both Algeria and Libya are
ideologiacally far to the left of Tunisia and far more committed to the pan-
Arab cause. Although both nations have been perceived as real threats to
Tunisia, the possibilty of a serious military clash is small. An interesting
aspect of this situation is that seemingly natural alliances in the Maghreb-
pro-Western Tunisia and Morocco, and leftist Algeria and Libya—have not
occurred. The current alliances are Tunisia/Algeria and Libya/Morocco,
although political alliances in North Africa should not be taken too seriously.
In order for the relationship between the United States and post-
Bourguiba Tunisia to be meaningful and enduring, a number of prerequisites
must be present:
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(1) An American understanding of Tunisian society and sensitivity
toward regional and Arab concerns;
(2) Development in Tunisia of a government system that prevents
agreements from becoming the personal projects of one dominant
individual;
(3) Regional peace;
(4) Increased participation by Tunisia in the international economy;
(5) Open communication between the two countries regarding the
national interests and foreign policies of each.
The issue over which the United States and Tunisia are currently most
greatly at odds is certainly the Arab -Israeli conflict. The two counties were
able to play down this issue in their bilateral relations as long as Tunisia was
not directly involved in the conflict, but the Israel air strike on PLO
headquarters near Tunis has brought Tunisia dramatically into that war.
How the United States deals with the Arab-Israeli issue in Tunisia now will
be critical to the role America plays in the search for a peaceful resolution to
the conflict. Because the United States counts both Tunisia and Israel among
its best friends in the Mediterranean region, it must avoid isolating one in
favor of the other. Only an even-handed policy, carefully maintaining good
relations with both countries, will permit America to gain and maintain
credibility as a serious negotiating power. The historical Tunisian view of
how the Arab-Israeli conflict should be approached is actually in substantial
agreement with the U.S. view, and Tunisia remains a potential ally of the U.S.
in this matter.
The United States has important and complex interests in North Africa
and the Middle East. Positive American relations with Tunisia can contribute
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significantly toward promoting those interests. If developed with courage
and far-sightedness. United States policy in Tunisia will enhance the
American image, satisfy strategic goals, and ultimately improve the chances
for a peaceful resolution of the Palestine question.
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APPENDIX A: COUNTRY DATA
Government
Official Name of State: Republic of Tunisia
Type of Government Republic
Head of State: President- for -Life Habib Bourguiba (also Commander-in-
Chief of Armed Forces)
Head of Government: Prime Minister Mohammed Mzali
Defense Minister: Salah ad-Din Bali
Chief of Staff of Armed Forces: Major-Generai Mohammed Gzara
Local Divisions: 2 1 Governor ates
Flag: Rectangular red field with a white circular portion in center; a red
crescent and a red five-point star within the white area
People
Population: 6.9 million
Population Density: 42 per sq. km. (109 per sq. mi.)
Age Distribution: 0- 1 4 43.3%
15-59 50.9%
over 59 5.8%
Ethnic Subdivisions: Arabs/Berbers 96.0%
Europeans 0.8%
Others 3.2%






Commercial - French, Arabic
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Geography
Area: 63,362 sq. mi. (163,610 sq. km.)
Capital: Tunis
Time: GMT+1
Cities: Tunis (1,200,000 population)
Sfax (475,000 population)
Economy
Industries: Food Processing Chief Crops: Grains/cereals
Textiles Dates
Oil products Olives







Oil Reserves (1980): 2.25 billion barrels
Arable Land: 30 percent
Labor Force: 35% agriculture
22% industry
1 1 % service
Finance
Currency: Tunisian Dinar ($1 U.S. = .71 dinar in March 1984)
Gross National Product(1982): $8.4 billion
Per Capita Income (1982): $1,200
Imports (1983): $3.1 billion Exports (1983): $1.8 billion
Partners: France 26% Partners: U.S. 23%
Italy 15% France 19%




Motor Vehicles in Use ( 1 982): 141 ,000 passenger cars
141,000 commercial vehicles
Chief Ports: Tunis, Sfai, Biserte
Communications
Television sets in use ( 1 98 1 ): 300,000
Radios in use (1982): 1,000,000
Telephones in use (1981): 188,000
Daily newspaper circulation (1982): 49 per 1,000 population
Education (1982)
Literacy: 62%
Years education compulsory: 8
Attendance: 85%
Sources:
1. The World Almanac and Book of Facts. 1985. Newspaper Enterprise
Association, 1984
2. Tunisia: A Country Study. American University Press, 1979
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APPENDIX C: GOVERNMENT STRUCTURE
President of the Republic \
(Head of State) I





































































APPENDIX D: MILITARY STRENGTH
Manoower
Military forces:
Army 30,000 (26,000 conscripts)
Air Force 2,500 (500 conscripts)
Navy 2,600 (500 conscripts)












M-41 Walker Bulldog U.S.A. 20
Armored Cars (APCs/ARVs)
Saladin U.K. 20
Panhard EBR-75 France 30
Panhard AML-60 France 10
M-113/M-125/M-577 U.S.A. 60
FiatOTO-6614 Italy no
V-150 Commando U.S.A. a few
Artillery
155mm M-109 U.S.A. 20


























































Large Patrol Craft France
Coastal Patrol Craft France
Fast Attack Craft, Missile France
Fast Attack Craft, Patrol U.K.
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